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The Interest Rate Parity (IRP) relationship is one of the most relied upon indicators of 
financial globalization. IRP plays such a key role in global macroeconomic models that it 
is taken as a benchmark for perfect capital mobility between markets. In this paper, we 
review the theoretical basis and historical origins of the interest rate parity relationship. 
Empirical evidence supporting IRP became so wide-spread that by the start of the 21st 
century, economists and financial professionals essentially took IRP for granted. 
However, with the start of the global financial crisis in summer 2007 deviations from IRP 
increased significantly. Empirical evidence suggests that deviations can be linked to 
greater credit and counterparty risk among bank dealers, and a reduction in risk capital, as 
well as wider bid-ask spreads in currency markets. In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, deviations from covered interest parity have increased considerably relative to a 
decade ago. Calibrating whether these deviations are efficient market violations, or 
simply a reflection of greater costs and risks, is a new challenge for financial economists.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared for The Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, edited by Gerard Caprio, 
Elsevier Publishing Inc. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
The Interest Rate Parity (IRP) relationship is one of the most relied upon 
indicators of financial globalization. When the parity relationship holds, covered yields 
are identical on assets that are similar in all important respects (e.g. maturity, default risk, 
exposure to capital controls, and liquidity) except for their currency of denomination. The 
parity relationship plays such a key role in global macroeconomic models that IRP is 
taken as a benchmark for perfect capital mobility between markets. Like other parity 
conditions in international finance, IRP has historical origins that go back centuries to 
David Hume, David Ricardo and possibly earlier. In the twentieth century, the theory of 
interest rate parity was formalized by John Maynard Keynes (1923). Empirical studies in 
the later half of the twentieth century documented the extent to which various factors 
such as asynchronous data, non-comparability in asset risks, transaction costs, and taxes 
accounted for deviations from parity. With the development of offshore capital markets 
in the 1960s, researchers found a market setting where the data largely supported IRP up 
to a tolerance that depended on foreign exchange and money market transaction costs. 
For the next 50 years, further research on higher frequency data, assets with longer 
maturities, and alternative pairs of currencies provided further support to the IRP 
relationship. However, in financial markets where mobility is impeded, deviations from 
IRP can be large and volatile. Common examples include countries that restrict currency 
convertibility. A more vivid example is the recent global financial crisis that commencing 
in the summer of 2007 allowed substantial deviations from IRP among the world’s major 
convertible currencies.  
Levich – Interest Rate Parity – MS #17, Revised August 31, 2011 2
In the remainder of this chapter, we review the theoretical basis and historical 
origins of the interest rate parity relationship. In section 3, we introduce the idea of 
‘limits to arbitrage’ and other factors often associated with parity deviations. We present 
empirical evidence on parity in section 4. More recent evidence of deviations during the 
2007-09 financial crisis, and possible explanations, are discussed in section 5. The final 
section offers conclusions and cautionary notes on the interpretation of deviations from 
IRP.  
2. Origins and Theory of Interest Rate Parity 
Arbitrage is a central concept in financial economics. References to arbitrage and 
its impact on prices can be found in the works of early political economists such as 
Ricardo (1811), Cournot (1838) and Walras (1870).1 It was John Maynard Keynes, 
however, writing in the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) who popularized the 
expression interest rate parity. Keynes described (in words) the mathematical notion of 
parity between the forward premium and interest differential, and also offered a list of 
reasons why parity might be violated, as it often was in many markets during Keynes’ 
life.  
To develop the parity relation, consider a world with two currencies, the USD ($) 
and the GBP (£), one-period interest rates in the two currencies given by i($,1) and i(£,1) 
and spot and one-period forward rates in $/£ defined by St and Ft,1 respectively. The 
forward contract binds the buyer to deliver Ft,1 units of USD in one period, in exchange 
for £1. On the other hand, an agent could borrow St/(1+i(£,1)) units of USD today at a 
                                                 
1 For example, in Walras (1874, Lesson 34, para. 314) “Whenever this state of general equilibrium is 
disturbed, it will be restored by arbitrage operations in bills of  exchange exactly like arbitrage operations 
in commodities. … Bills of exchange are par excellence the most suitable commodities for arbitrage 
operations.”  
 
Levich – Interest Rate Parity – MS #17, Revised August 31, 2011 3
cost of i($,1), exchange the USD for GBP in the spot market, and invest those GBP at the 
rate i(£,1) for one-period, which would also result in net proceeds of £1 one period hence. 
Both alternatives: (1) buying one GBP at a cost Ft,1 and (2) borrowing USD today at a 
cost i($,1), converting the USD to GBP in the spot market, and investing those GBP at 
the rate i(£,1) result in the same cash flows in period one. As a result, ignoring the impact 
of transaction costs, taxes, and uncertainty, the two alternatives must have the same price 
or cost. This equality of prices is summarized in equation 1.  
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Equation (1) demonstrates that in equilibrium, the forward rate is set equal to the 
spot rate augmented by the ratio of yields between the two currencies. The equation also 
implies that the forward rate is a redundant instrument. The cash flows of a forward 
contract can be fully replicated by a spot contract combined with borrowing and lending 
in the two currencies. This fact helps to explain why forward contracts are typically not 
observed in less developed or emerging financial markets where borrowing and lending is 
limited, and why deviations from parity could appear when either borrowing or lending is 
impeded.  
It is a simple matter, but still useful, to rearrange the terms in equation (1) to 
inspect the following relationships. 
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Equation (2) reveals that investing in USD is equivalent to first converting USD to GBP 
in the spot market, then investing GBP at the market interest rate, and covering the 
currency exposure by selling principal and expected interest earnings in GBP at the 
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forward rate Ft,1. Equation (3) demonstrates the analogous concept, that the yield on a 
GBP position is equivalent to the yield on a USD position teamed with a forward contract 
to cover against exchange risk. Equations (2) and (3) help clarify that in equilibrium, 
markets should reach a parity (i.e. Interest Rate Parity) between interest rates in foreign 
and domestic currencies. Because the replicating transaction involves covering foreign 
currency exposure, interest rate parity is sometimes referred to as the Covered Interest 
Parity (CIP) relationship.  
 Equations (2) and (3) also suggest that if borrowing in one market, say USD, is 
impeded, then agents can compensate by borrowing in GBP and simultaneously entering 
into offsetting spot and forward currency contracts. Or if investing in GBP seems subject 
to unusual costs or risks, agents can create a synthetic GBP position by investing in a 
USD security and simultaneously entering into offsetting spot and forward currency 
contracts. Creating synthetic positions is straightforward, but as we discuss in Section 5, 
they can create considerable value when financial markets are constrained or under stress. 
Precisely at these times, investors may willingly choose a synthetic that yields less, or 
borrowers may choose a synthetic that costs more in order to overcome a market 
dislocation.  
By taking equation (1) and subtracting one from both the left and right-hand-side 
terms, we have  
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which shows that the percentage forward premium is (approximately) equal to the interest 
differential. In equilibrium, a currency with the high interest rate should trade a forward 
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discount to reflect the fact that a lower return is available in the second currency.2 
Readers should be careful to distinguish equation (4) from the Uncovered Interest Parity 
(UIP) relationship which states that the interest differential should equal the expected rate 
of depreciation in the USD (home currency), or  
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Covered interest parity (equation 4) suggests a pure arbitrage in which prices of all four 
variables can be observed simultaneously, while UIP relies on the expected future spot 
rate which cannot be observed directly at time t, or compared to the actual future spot rate 
until time t+1. 
The IRP equilibrium condition described in equations (1) – (4) is facilitated by 
arbitrage. In equation (1), if Ft,1 were less than the synthetic price given by )£,1(1
)1($,1
i
iSt +
+ , 
arbitragers would buy the forward contract and sell the synthetic, helping to restore a 
balance. “Selling the synthetic” GBP forward would entail borrowing GBP, buying USD 
in the spot market, and investing in USD for one period. In equation (2), if USD interest 
rates exceeded GBP rates on a covered basis, arbitragers would borrow in GBP, hedge 
themselves with spot and forward contracts, and lend the synthetic USD at a higher rate. 
At the margin, arbitrage purchases tend to raise prices (of currency and money market 
instruments), sales tend to lower prices (of currency and money market instruments), and 
thus tend reduce any measured deviations from parity. However, arbitrage transactions 
entail both costs (in currency markets and money markets) and risks (of default on 
investment positions or forward contracts, or possible controls on capital movements). 
                                                 
2 For example, given S = 1.50 $/£, i($) = 4% and i(£) = 8%, we expect F = 1.444 $/£. The GBP has the 
higher interest rate and it is at a discount (i.e. cheaper) in the forward market.  
Levich – Interest Rate Parity – MS #17, Revised August 31, 2011 6
These costs and risks serve to limit the amount of arbitrage and retard the speed or even 
preclude an ultimate convergence of rates toward parity.  
.  
3. Limits to Arbitrage and Factors Associated with Parity Deviations 
While the mathematics of IRP are straightforward, it has long been recognized 
that there are many reasons why the forward premium and interest differential would not 
satisfy a simple mathematical relationship. Keynes (1923) provided a list of cautionary 
reasons why arbitrage might be insufficient to produce IRP. He emphasized that 
arbitragers can be subject to credit risks if a counterparty were to default on a forward 
contract or on a investment position in one currency (that is used to offset a short position 
in another currency). When the legs of an arbitrage are conducted in different countries, 
another risk is opened through possible capital controls and sovereign risks. As Keynes 
(1923, pp. 126-7) argued, arbitragers might weigh the “small turns” they could earn out 
of interest differentials against the possibility of large losses through a credit event, and 
find that these “may deter conservative banks from doing the business on a substantial 
scale at any reasonable rate at all.” In much the same vein, Keynes suggested that these 
risks could curtail the amount of funds committed to arbitrage. As he expressed it, “the 
floating capital normally available, and ready to move from centre to centre for the 
purpose of taking advantage of moderate arbitrage profits between spot and forward 
exchange, is by no means unlimited in amount, and is not always adequate to the 
market’s requirements.”3 
During Keynes’ lifetime and up until the development of offshore capital markets, 
deviations from CIP were frequent, and typically attributed to these usual suspects. In the 
                                                 
3 Keynes (1923, pp. 128-9). 
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first foreign exchange market monograph prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Holmes (1959) adopted Keynes’ assertion that deviations from CIP would need to 
reach 0.50% per annum to make it worthwhile for arbitragers to move funds from one 
market to another. Holmes reaffirmed that during the Bretton-Woods period, arbitrage 
flows could be limited by exchange controls in place, but flows could also be deterred by 
possible future controls, sovereign risks, bank credit risk, as well as the limited stock of 
bank capital available. Holmes (1959, pp. 51-2) discussed several examples including the 
Suez Canal crisis of October 1956 and the Sterling Exchange Crisis of August 1957 that 
opened up sizeable CIP deviations (of 2-3 percent or more) favoring flows to the USD 
and out of GBP. These deviations calculated using U.S. and U.K. Treasury Bill rates 
lasted for several weeks or more, to be eventually trimmed when domestic policy 
responded to the imbalance or the crisis subsided. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence on Interest Rate Parity from the Last 50 Years 
Empirical studies of covered interest parity have focused on a short list of 
possible explanations – transaction costs, risk of default or non-performance in foreign 
exchange contracts, sovereign risks and capital controls, taxes, and non-synchronous or 
poor-quality data – most of which were alluded to by Keynes. In their survey of studies 
from the 1950s and 1960s, Officer and Willett (1970) highlighted the importance of 
limits to arbitrage and transaction costs in allowing deviations from CIP, which they 
concluded “need not imply either disequilibrium or market imperfection.” However, 
accurate measures of transaction costs and market imperfection were still an unsettled 
matter.  
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a. Early Empirical Studies 
Branson (1969) is one of the earliest studies to investigate how tightly market data 
satisfied CIP. Using weekly data over a six-year period, 1959-64, Branson measured the 
arbitrage incentive between US and UK Treasury bills. Market discussions in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin labeled certain periods as “speculative.” Once those periods were 
eliminated, Branson estimated that the average deviation was about 0.18%, which he took 
as a reasonable figure, lower than 0.50% offered by Keynes and higher than a 0.06% 
estimate offered by Einzig (1961) both based on their market experience. Calculations 
using US and Canadian Treasury Bills over a shorter period produced a similar 0.18% 
estimate of the minimum inventive needed to induce covered arbitrage between these 
countries.  
About the same time, Aliber (1973) offered the idea that arbitrage between 
traditional Treasury Bills exposed the arbitrageur to differential political risks and risks of 
capital controls. If one considered arbitrage between offshore instruments (e.g. $ and £ 
deposits issued by the same Zurich bank), then political risks would be identical and not 
separately impede arbitrage. Based on weekly data for the January 1968 – June 1970 
period, Aliber showed that CIP deviations were far smaller, and more tightly distributed 
around zero, using offshore instruments compared to Treasury Bills.4 Furthermore 
deviations in the offshore market were symmetrical about zero, whereas deviations using 
Treasury Bills were skewed right and occasionally very large (ranging from 2% to over 
8.0%). This led Aliber to conclude that CIP using Treasury Bills captured a non-random 
element which he labeled political risk.  
                                                 
4 Aliber (1970) reported that 81% of the deviations were within 0.5% using offshore instruments, while 
only 28% were within that interval using Treasury Bills.  
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In a pair of papers, Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) proposed a new technique 
for measuring the efficiency of international capital market in eliminating arbitrage profit 
opportunities. Rather than make an interpretation based on a regression of the forward 
premium against an interest differential, or calculation of the mean deviation, FL argued 
that each data point should be treated as a separate event and a new opportunity for the 
market to engage in arbitrage and establish parity. Thus how well CIP worked could be 
summarized by the percentage of data points captured within a “neutral band” given by 
an independent estimate of transaction costs. Using estimates of foreign exchange 
transaction costs (based on triangular currency arbitrage) and money market transaction 
costs (based on spreads), FL (1975) showed that after taking transaction costs into 
account, there were few, if any, deviations from CIP remaining in 1962-67, a tranquil 
pegged rate period. In that sense, CIP held exceedingly well among currency pairs in the 
offshore market. 
In a follow-up paper, FL (1977) extended their sample to include 1968-69, a more 
turbulent pegged rate period, and 1973-75, a managed floating rate period immediately 
after the demise of Bretton Woods. Once again considering arbitrage between the $ and £ 
(as well as the Canadian dollar), FL concluded that transactions costs had risen during 
both the turbulent peg and managed floating periods, but CIP still held in the sense that in 
offshore markets, very few observations indicated the availability of an arbitrage profit 
after taking transaction costs in account.  
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b. Refinements to the Traditional Model and Improved Data 
Over the next 10-15 years, various authors contributed additional refinements to 
the basic textbook story of interest rate parity. Some authors focused on the size of the 
neutral band (believing that previous studies had overstated the margin needed to induce 
arbitrage), others considered omitted factors (such as taxes), and still others investigated 
how empirical estimates of transaction costs and the quality and periodicity of data 
impacted the results.  
Deardorff (1979) hypothesized that “round trip” arbitrage – that is, starting with 
one USD and measuring whether 4 transactions, either clockwise or counter-clockwise as 
in Exhibit 1 left the arbitrageur with more or less than one USD – was really an overly 
demanding measure. In practice, a manager holding USD today but needing GBP in one 
period had two stylistic choices. The manager could (1) enter into a forward purchase of 
GBP today and retain his USD earning interest until delivery date on the forward, or (2) 
buy GBP on the spot market today and invest the proceeds at the market interest rate for 
one period. Deardorff argued that even the smallest discrepancy would induce the 
manager to pick the lowest purchase price, and help restore parity. Deardorff showed that 
the interest rate parity “box” in Exhibit 1 held many similar comparisons, which he 
dubbed “one-way arbitrage.” Deardorff claimed that the incentives to engage in one-way 
arbitrage were so prevalent, that these would take hold first, result in far smaller 
deviations from IRP, and in all likelihood preclude the possibility of round-trip arbitrage 
based on market prices.  
Levi (1977) observed that the traditional IRP formulation ignored taxes and that 
as a practical matter it was after-tax (rather than pre-tax) gains and losses that drove 
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arbitrage. If taxes applied similarly on gains and losses in currency markets as well as on 
interest paid or earned on money market instruments, then the traditional expression of 
IRP (our equation 4, for example) would be unaffected. However, if currency market 
transactions were subject to capital gains tax (τk), and interest income were subject to 
ordinary income tax (τy), and the tax rates were unequal, then the interest rate parity line 
would no longer be a 45° line as implied by equation (4). In particular, in the likely case 
that τk < τy, the IRP line would flatten.  
For example, assume τk = 25% and τy 50% meaning that arbitrageurs kept three-
quarters of the gain on a forward-spot transaction, but only one-half of the net interest 
earned from the interest differential. The ratio (1-τy ) / (1-τk) = 0.50/0.75 = 0.67 suggests 
that the after-tax IRP line has a slope of 0.67 compared the pre-tax IRP line which has a 
slope of 1.0. In addition, Levi noted that it was possible for residents of one country to 
face the tax rates just described while residents of another country could face no taxes or 
equal taxes on capital gains and interest charges. It that case, covered interest arbitrage 
could entail a measure of tax arbitrage as well.5 
While Levi’s treatment of taxes raises challenges to the traditional model, market 
prices are ultimately determined by the marginal actor, who in forex markets is likely to 
be a hedge fund or bank operating offshore in a low-tax or no-tax setting. In this case, 
while the traditional IRP line would still reflect market equilibrium, any agents subject to 
differential capital gains and ordinary income tax rates could see these points as a profit 
opportunity.  
                                                 
5 Still other complications are introduced when short-term transactions are subject to ordinary income tax 
rates while long-term transaction are given capital gains tax treatment.  
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Adler and Dumas (1979) argued that the traditional formulation of IRP assumed 
that forward contracts were risk-free when in fact these contracts, as well as bank money 
market instruments, were subject to default. Adler and Dumas went on to suggest that the 
risk in forward contracts and covered interest arbitrage transactions should not be treated 
in isolation, but rather in the context of the larger portfolio of stocks and bonds open to 
investors. Despite this, the authors acknowledged that in practice and during “normal” 
times, an interbank market restricted to very high quality names might operate 
independently to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. 
Adding to the discussion of political risk as a source of deviations from IRP, 
Dooley and Isard (1980) highlighted the distinction between known capital controls in 
place, and the prospect of future capital controls. The former, because they are known, 
represent only a cost or barrier to arbitrage, while the latter are unknown and represent a 
risk that could inhibit arbitrage. During the 1970-73 period of controls in Germany, the 
authors concluded that as much as 1-2 percent per annum of observed deviations from 
IRP could be attributed to the political risk of future controls.  
Other authors focused more on the quality and type of data used in empirical 
studies of IRP. Clinton (1988) noted that interbank dealers typically trade in FX swaps 
(representing a simultaneous purchase and sale of foreign exchange) that benefit from a 
single small bid-ask spread rather than deal separately in spot and forward contracts 
which each carry their own spread. With this modification, Clinton showed that the width 
of the neutral bank in IRP was smaller than in previous studies. Despite this, Clinton’s 
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empirical evidence still supported the conclusion that markets were efficiently 
eliminating nearly all arbitrage opportunities.6  
Taylor (1989) offered the first empirical study using high-frequency data that was 
carefully time-synchronized. Taylor’s data covered three days (November 11, 12, and 13) 
in 1985 taking observations every 10 minutes from 9:00 am until 4:50 pm for a total of 
144 data points per day. Observations on all IRP variables were recorded to have a 
tolerance of one minute with each other. Taylor’s metric was similar to the Frenkel-
Levich (1975, 1977) studies, that is simply counting the number of profit opportunities 
available through arbitrage for different currency pairs (US dollar-German mark, and US 
dollar-UK sterling) and different maturities (1, 3, 6, and 12 months). With four 
maturities, six borrowing-lending currency combinations, and 144 data points the 
complete sample totaled 3,456 observations. Taylor confirmed that the foreign exchange 
market was highly efficient in the sense that there were virtually no opportunities for 
round-trip arbitrage, and only few and scattered possibilities for one-way arbitrage.  
 
c. Further Applications and Empirical Evidence on IRP 
As empirical evidence favoring covered interest parity mounted, researchers 
moved on to consider further implications of IRP as well as various financing and 
investment strategies based on equation (4) and also to subject the theory to more 
stringent tests based on higher frequency data.  
                                                 
6 McCormick (1979) also raised the possibility that published, printed data sources available in the 1970s 
might not be adequately time-synchronized and could overstate interbank trading costs. Even so, 
McCormick (1979, p. 416) concluded that using higher quality Reuters exchange market data led to the 
same result that virtually all discrepancies from CIP in the offshore market could be explained by 
transaction costs. 
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In the lead up to the floating exchange rate period, stylistic models in international 
finance often considered real interest rate equalization as a criterion for international 
capital mobility. In somewhat the same vein, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) reasoned that 
if capital were perfectly mobile internationally, then countries should be able to borrow 
enough abroad to fund domestic investment whenever there was a shortfall in domestic 
savings or government crowding out. Finding that national investment and savings rates 
were highly correlated led Feldstein and Horioka to conclude that capital was not highly 
mobile, a conclusion that seemed at odds with the surge in international financial activity. 
Against this backdrop, Frankel and MacArthur (1988) examined data for 24 countries, 
including many smaller industrialized countries and emerging markets. Frankel and 
MacArthur measured the size of covered interest differentials, which they took as 
measures of the barriers to international capital mobility. Overall, the authors concluded 
that “the covered interest differential is a better measure of capital mobility – in the sense 
of financial market integration across national boundaries – not only than savings-
investment correlations, but also than real interest differentials.”7 Covered interest parity 
remains the benchmark for detecting departures from perfect capital mobility.  
As financial markets in other countries developed, and in particular as the 
currency swap market developed, market practitioners implicitly relied on covered 
interest arbitrage to synthetically create new securities and develop opportunistic 
strategies toward borrowing and investing. For example, where companies were 
constrained to obtain funding through illiquid, and relatively costly, bank loans, many 
firms elected to borrow using liquid, low cost USD commercial paper and swap the 
proceeds into their domestic currency using spot and forward contracts. This is a direct 
                                                 
7 Frankel and MacArthur (1988, p. 1111) 
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application of equation (3) and equivalent to creating a synthetic domestic currency 
commercial paper contract. In another application of equation (3), Koh and Levich (1994) 
demonstrated that highly liquid USD interest rate futures contracts could be combined 
with currency futures contracts to create synthetic foreign currency interest rate futures. 
These examples illustrate the use of synthetics to overcome a particular market failure – 
either the lack of a domestic commercial paper market or a domestic interest rate futures 
market.  
On the other hand, equation (2) suggests that if borrowers could spot unusually 
low funding rates abroad (or if investors could spot unusually high yields), then 
combining the foreign currency security with a currency swap could translate and 
preserve these gains into the agent’s home USD currency. In separate studies, McBrady 
and Schill (2007) examine a large sample of sovereign government and agency issuers 
and McBrady, Mortal and Schill (2010) examine a similarly large sample of international 
corporate bond offerings. The authors find that the currency choices for both sets of 
issuers follow an opportunistic pattern. In an example of one-way arbitrage, bond issues 
appear timed to take advantage of deviations from long-term covered interest parity, even 
when the yield difference is as small as 4 to 14 basis points. The analysis leads McBrady, 
Mortal and Schill (2010, p. 695) to conjecture that “that opportunistic issuance by 
corporations may be a primary mechanism for driving covered interest yields toward 
parity.” 
Finally, just prior to the recent global financial crisis, Akram, Rime and Sarno 
(2008, 2009) produced a pair of studies based on tick-by-tick data over a seven-month 
period (February 13 – September 30, 2004), 3 exchange rates (USD/EUR, USD/GBP, 
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and JPY/USD) and 4 maturities (1, 3, 6, and 12 months). Counting bid and ask 
quotations, the number of sample observations exceeds 45 million. At this level of 
microscopic examination, the authors develop several important findings. First, 
deviations from covered interest parity are present in the data; they are short lived (from 
30 seconds to 4 minutes in some cases) but they are economically significant. 
Opportunities for one-way arbitrage (both so-called owner’s arbitrage and borrower’s 
arbitrage) appear more numerous (perhaps 10-50% of the observations) and these may 
also be economically significant (in the range of 2-6 pips). These profit opportunities are 
quickly dissipated, more so when market activity is high, but less so when volatility 
increases. Overall, the market seems fairly efficient while still opening a window for 
algorithmic traders to search out very small profits in the dispersed forex market 
landscape. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence on Interest Rate Parity During the Global Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 thrust most financial markets into a period 
of stress and disruption of certain trading metrics. In some respects, foreign exchange 
markets continued to operate smoothly. For example, spot currency trading volume in 
London and New York actually rose in October 2008 compared to October 2007. And 
because of the CLS Bank launched in 2002, banks could confidently trade forex with 
other banks and many corporate counterparties without fear of a total loss resulting from 
settlement risk given default by a counterparty.8 In other respects, however, the foreign 
                                                 
8 In a forex trade involving USD 1,500,000 exchanged for GBP 1,000,000 the CLS Bank collects both legs 
of the transaction before sending the funds on to the appropriate counterparty, thus eliminating settlement 
risk. However, not all forex trades are intermediated by the CLS Bank. Indeed, the German KFW Bank 
delivered EUR 300 million to Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and lost the entire amount as the 
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exchange market experienced disruptions similar to that in other markets. Melvin and 
Taylor (2009) document that comparing the post-Lehman crisis period of Sept-Oct. 2008 
with the pre-crisis period of Sept-Oct. 2007, bid-ask spreads in spot and 3-month swap 
transactions in the major currency pairs increased by a factor of 4-5 times, or more. 
Spreads for longer maturities, less active currency pairs and larger size deals experienced 
even greater increases.  
Deviations from covered interest parity provide their own barometer of conditions 
in the foreign exchange market. Exhibit 2 shows 3-month CIP deviations for the EUR-
USD daily from January 1, 2000 until September 30, 2010. The period through July 2007 
appears tranquil with essentially all deviations bounded within 25 basis points of parity 
and upwards of 95% of all deviations bounded with 10 basis points of parity. This period 
strongly conveys the notion of a highly liquid market with virtually perfect capital 
mobility between short-term EUR and USD instruments.  
Whiffs of the impending crisis appear in the summer of 2007 when two hedge 
funds operated by Bear Stearns suspended redemptions and BNP-Paribas announced that 
they were unable to value three hedge funds. By the fall of 2007, one of the top mortgage 
banks in the United Kingdom, Northern Rock, sought support from the Bank of England. 
By February 2008, Northern Rock was nationalized, and by March 2008, Bear Stearns 
collapsed and was sold to JP Morgan Chase. In the initial phase of this pre-Lehman crisis 
period, deviations from CIP jumped to roughly 40 basis points, then recovered, and after 
the Bear Stearns collapse returned to the 40-50 basis point range through the summer of 
2008.  
                                                                                                                                                 
bankrupt Lehman could not deliver their USD leg of the transaction. See Levich (2009) for a discussion of 
the role of the CLS Bank in forex clearing and settlement.  
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Once Lehman Brothers failed on September 15, 2008, deviations from CIP in the 
most active currency pair in the most active financial market in the world spiked to over 
200 basis points and for the most part remained above 100 basis points for the next three 
months. Even though CIP deviations subsided to the 25-50 basis point range by spring 
2009, and have continued in this range for the remainder of the sample, it is clear that this 
is a far higher range compared to the tranquil period of near perfect capital mobility in the 
first few years of the millennium.9  
Several authors have studied what factors led to the sharp increase in CIP 
deviations at the start of the crisis, and the rapid decline in CIP deviations in the spring of 
2009. According to Baba and Packer (2009) and corroborated by Coffey et al. (2009), the 
combination of funding shortages in the US financial markets as well as a heightened 
sense of counterparty risk even among large banks active in the foreign exchange market 
led to a deterioration in liquidity and observed deviations from covered interest parity in 
the USD-EUR pair.10 Both of these studies find that prior to the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, capital constraints and liquidity risk proxies explain much of the observed 
deviations from CIP. After the Lehman collapse, Coffey et al. (2009 September) find that 
counterparty risk and credit risk proxies become significant variables explaining CIP 
deviations. Genberg et al. (2009) analyze CIP deviations for the USD-EUR and five other 
currency pairs. Their results suggest that CIP deviations were smaller for Hong Kong, 
                                                 
9 Graphs of several other exchange shown in the Appendix reveal a similar pattern of small CIP deviations 
during the tranquil period up until the summer of 2007, followed by a period of increasing turbulence and 
larger CIP deviations, and then a large spike in deviations after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. In most 
cases, CIP deviations are now generally larger than at the start of the millennium.  
10 Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) analyze CIP deviations using high frequency data on 5 currency pairs 
including the EUR-CHF, a non-dollar pair. The authors conclude that most CIP deviations can be explained 
by funding liquidity constraints in USD, and only a small part due to the risk of default by the forward 
counterparty. Hence, based on this dataset, the possibility of risk was not a major factor in limiting 
arbitrage and opening up CIP deviations.  
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Japan and Singapore (versus the USD) consistent with lower implied bank default risks in 
those countries.  
During the crisis period, banks outside the United State had particular difficulty 
accessing USD facilities. To meet their various USD funding obligations, these banks 
turned to the synthetic approach suggested by equation (2). By borrowing in the their 
home currencies (EUR, GBP, or others), perhaps through access to the home central 
bank, and then executing an FX swap, banks could synthetically create a USD position, 
but only at a premium to a direct position in USD.11 The synthetic approach helps to 
understand one policy response to this aspect of the global financial crisis.  
In the spring of 2009, the U.S. Federal Reserve along with other central banks 
opened up substantial official swap facilities. With these official swaps, the supply of 
USD offshore increased and non-U.S. banks could access USD through their home 
central bank rather than through their traditional U.S. commercial bank counterparties 
(who were subject to heightened default risk). Coffey et al. (2009, September) show that 
the successive rounds of official swap facility lines opened in the spring 2009 played a 
significant role in bringing down CIP deviations, and in that sense, helping to restore 
greater international capital mobility. In a related study by Baba and Shim (2010), the 
authors show that the Bank of Korea’s use of U.S. Federal Reserve swap lines had a 
significant impact on reducing dislocations in the Korean won/US dollar market, while 
using the Bank’s own foreign reserve had no significant impact. Despite these policy 
initiatives, Exhibit 2 suggests that deviations from covered interest parity are 
                                                 
11 Baba and Packer (2009) note that the situation is analytically similar to that of Japanese banks in the 
1990s that faced a “Japan Premium” (i.e. higher borrowing costs in the offshore USD market) because of 
the declining credit quality of Japanese bank loan portfolios. Japanese banks could attempt to circumvent 
the premium by borrowing in JPY and entering into an FX swap to synthetically create a USD position. For 
more on the Japan Premium, see Peek and Rosengren (2001). 
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experiencing a new normal, with deviations in the range of 25-50 basis points for the 
EUR-USD pair rather than in the range of 10-25 basis points which had been observed a 
decade previously.  
 
6. Conclusions and Cautionary Notes on Parity Deviations  
As McBrady et al. (2010, p. 695) so well expressed it, “Interest rate parity is a 
bedrock assumption of international finance.” Over the first half of the twentieth century, 
comparisons of short-term Treasury-bill rates on a covered basis often showed sizeable 
departures from parity. For the most part, economists attributed much of these deviations 
to the costs and risks of executing arbitrage transactions. With the gradual opening up of 
international capital markets, and especially offshore markets in the 1960s and 1970s, 
measured departures from CIP shrunk substantially. Economists have come to define the 
covered interest parity condition as a measure of international capital mobility. By the 
start of the 21st century, economists essentially took covered interest parity for granted at 
least among the G10 countries and probably much more widely. Sovereigns and private 
companies were active in international market, searching for minor deviations from CIP 
and seizing upon them to issue (or buy) foreign bonds, execute a currency swap, and lock 
in a small, but nearly risk-free gain.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, currency bid-ask spreads have 
widened, counterparty risks seem greater and more uncertain, and in many cases risk 
capital is more scarce and expensive. In this setting, deviations from covered interest 
parity have widened considerably relative to a decade ago. The challenge for researchers 
as well as practitioners is to accurately measure and price the costs of strategies based on 
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deviations from CIP. All observed deviations from CIP are not necessarily efficient 
market violations. Deviations from CIP can reflect the implicit additional cost and risk of 
trying to utilize the lower cost, or higher yielding currency on a covered basis. Measuring 
those costs, and recalibrating the efficiency and mobility of international capital markets 
is a new challenge for financial economists.  
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Exhibit 1.  Round-Trip Arbitrage Flows in Covered 
Interest Parity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Labels (buy, sell, borrow, lend) refer to the counter-clockwise transactions. 
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Exhibit 2.  Deviations from Covered Interest Parity in the EUR-USD, 3-Month 
Maturity. Daily data January 1, 2000 – September 30, 2010.  
 Source: Bloomberg. 
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Appendix.  Deviations from Covered Interest Parity, Selected Currency Pairs, 3-
Month Maturity. Daily data January 1, 2000 – September 30, 2010.  
 Source: Bloomberg. 
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